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Abstract—Self-healing key distribution schemes are particu-
larly useful when there is no network infrastructure or such
infrastructure has been destroyed. A self-healing mechanism can
allow group users to recover lost session keys and is therefore
quite suitable for establishing group keys over an unreliable
network, especially for infrastructureless wireless networks,
where broadcast messages loss may occur frequently. An efficient
threshold self-healing key distribution scheme with favorable
properties is proposed in this paper. Firstly, the distance between
two broadcasts used to recover the lost one is alterable according
to network conditions. This alterable property can be used to
shorten the length of the broadcast messages. Secondly, any more
than threshold-value users can sponsor a new user to join the
group for the subsequent sessions without any interaction with
the group manager. Thirdly, the storage overhead of the self-
healing key distribution at each group user is a polynomial over
a finite field, which will not increase with the number of sessions.
In addition, if a smaller group of users up to a threshold-value
were revoked, the personal keys for non-revoked users can be
reused.
Index Terms—Authentication, infrastructureless wireless net-
work, ad hoc network, self-healing, key distribution, secret
sharing, wireless sensor network.
I. INTRODUCTION
AN infrastructureless network offers a means of addressingthe needs for a more flexible, durable and cost efficient
network system than conventional centralized hierarchical
fixed infrastructure systems does. Infrastructureless wireless
networks, especially mobile wireless ad hoc networks, are
ideal candidates for communications in applications such
as rescue missions, scientific explorations and even military
operations. These potential applications highlight concerns
regarding security issues. Theoretically, all key distribution
schemes developed for reliable networks (e.g.[1]-[4]) can be
used in wireless networks with minor alternation. However,
mobility changes the topology of networks frequently [30].
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Fig. 1. An example of an infrastructureless wireless network. In this
infrastructureless wireless network, the communication topology in time slot
2 is different from the one in time slot 1.
Due to mobility of nodes, traditional security models designed
for fixed-network topologies may not be fully applicable
in infrastructureless wireless networks. Fig. 1 presents an
example of an infrastructrueless wireless network. To better
design an efficient and secure key distribution scheme, the
designers should consider many factors such as application
requirements, network topologies, and packet loss character-
istics of the underlying wireless networks.
Wireless networks have a certain number of peculiari-
ties [5]. First of all, there are no fixed infrastructures in
wireless networks. The nodes should act independently from
any centralized controller. Moreover, the nodes are battery
powered and have limited computational capabilities and
memory resources. It will reduce the availability of wireless
devices to adopt some power-consuming techniques such as
public key cryptography. Energy saving is an important system
design criterion. That is why symmetric-key ciphers and hash
functions have become the most favorable tools for protecting
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wireless communications. In addition, the topology can be
highly dynamic, hampering the stability of the links and of
the routes. Furthermore, nodes in mobile wireless networks
(i.e. wireless sensor networks or mobile ad hoc networks)
may move in and out of range frequently and even sometimes
be completely separated from the network. Key distribution
broadcast for a particular session might not reach a user as
scheduled. Thus, techniques without fault-tolerance features
cannot fully address the whole problem. Finally, security is
difficult to be implemented because of the vulnerability of the
wireless links and the limited physical protection of nodes.
Generally speaking, security in wireless networks has six
challenges [6]:
1) Lack of fixed infrastructure: this means all operations are
performed by nodes rather than centralized controllers.
2) Resource limitations on wireless devices: this implies
that power-consuming methods are inherently infeasible.
3) Unknown network topology prior to deployment: this
suggests that key pre-distribution schemes are a practical
option.
4) Wireless nature of communications: this means the
communication channels are unreliable and therefore
broadcast packets loss may occur frequently.
5) Very large density of distribution of wireless nodes: this
indicates that the security scheme must be scalable.
6) High risk of physical attacks to unattended nodes: this
will introduce a threat to the entire network.
Moreover, in some deployment scenarios wireless nodes need
to operate in an adversarial environment.
The research of distributing keys for wireless networks
has received significant attention [1]-[4], [6]-[8], [12]-[22],
[24]-[27], and [30]. The existing literature has focused on
concrete aspects. One example is broadcast encryption which
addresses the problem of sending an encrypted message to a
large user group so that the message can only be decrypted by
a dynamically changing privileged subset [9]-[11], [29], and
[32], . The other example is key pre-distribution which settles
the issue of unknown physical topology prior to deployment
[12]-[14]. However, such literature assumes the underlying
network is reliable. How to distribute session keys for wireless
networks, in a manner that can be resistant to packet loss, is
an issue that requires intensive examination.
In an unreliable network, the key distribution broadcast for
a particular session might never reach a user. Requiring re-
transmission would contribute to the traffic on a network that
might already be heavily burdened. Especially, when group
size is large, such re-transmissions could potentially exhaust
the group manager. In addition, in some high security envi-
ronments, it is suggested that only sending essential messages
reduces vulnerability. Hence, non-interactive key distribution
solutions are not only favorable but also necessary.
Self-healing key distribution has been reported to be quite
useful in several settings in which session keys need to be used
for a short time-period [19] and [27], due to frequent changes
in the group topology. Military-oriented applications as well
as Internet applications [16], such as broadcast transmissions,
pay-per-view TV, are a few important examples which can
benefit from such approaches. In addition, the self-healing
method may be useful in commercial content distribution
applications or electronic services in which the contents are
highly sensitive. In some e-commerce situations, a service
provider allows a number of service subscribers to pay for a
new customer to use the same service for a limited period. If
a key distribution scheme can realize that purpose and permits
a coalition of users to sponsor a user outside the underlying
group for one session, then the key distribution scheme is of
sponsorization capability.
In this paper, we will propose an efficient self-healing key
distribution scheme with sponsorization capability. The main
contribution of this paper is highlighted by the following
properties:
• The distance between two broadcasts which are used to
recover the lost one can be set according to the underlying
wireless networks. Working in this way facilitates a
shorter length of the broadcast messages.
• t + 1 or more users of the group can sponsor a new user
to join the group for subsequent sessions without any
interaction with the group manager.
• The storage overhead of personal keys at each group user
is a polynomial of Fp[y], which will not increase with the
number of sessions.
This paper presents an analysis of security and efficiency.
Findings performed here suggest that the proposed scheme
outperforms other self-healing key distribution schemes in
term of the length of broadcasts, sponsorization, and storage
overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we present an overview of existing works in the area of self-
healing key distribution systems. In Section III, we introduce
our system parameters followed by the security model and
concrete construction. An analysis of security and efficiency
of our proposed scheme compared with previous schemes are
documented in Section IV. This paper concludes with possible
future work. The notations in Table I are used throughout this
paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
The central idea of self-healing key distribution schemes
is that users, in large and dynamic group communications
over an unreliable network, can recover lost session keys. The
users can facilitate this recovery without requesting additional
transmissions from the group manager even if some previous
key distribution messages are lost. According to the technolo-
gies upon which they are based, self-healing key distribution
schemes can be categorized into three classes:
• Polynomial secret sharing based self-healing key distri-
bution schemes;
• Vector space secret sharing based self-healing key distri-
bution schemes;
• Hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes.
In this section, we review the related schemes according to
the three categories. The characteristics of these schemes are
summarized in subsection D of Section II.
A. Shamir’s secret sharing based self-healing key distribution
schemes
The first pioneering work of self-healing key distribution
schemes was introduced by Staddon et al. in [16]. Staddon et
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TABLE I
NOTATIONS
GM The group manager
U The Finite set of all users of a network
Ui The i-th user
n Total number of users in the network
m Total number of sessions
p A large prime number, p > n
Fp A field of order p
Rj The set of users revoked by GM in session j
Rj1 A coalition of users revoked before session j1
Jj The set of users who join the group in session j
Jj2 A coalition of users who join the group before session j2
TEKj Traffic Encryption Key in session j
TEKj(i) User Ui’s Traffic Encryption Key in the j-th session
Si Personal key of user Ui in the security model
Gj Communication group in session j
A User subset such that A ⊆ Gj and t + 1 ≤ |A| ≤ |Gj | ≤ n
P jAl Any more that t + 1 sponsorizations from a subset A ⊆ Gj in session j for Ui ∈ Gj
Kj Session key chosen by the GM in session j
Bj Broadcast message during session j
B1j and B
2
j Two parts of broadcast message Bj
B1j (i) Part of broadcast message of user Ui during session j
t The maximum number of compromised users
T The maximum number of keys user can recover one time
f() One-way permutation without collision
g() One-way function used to generate TEKj
f i(u) f is applied i times on u ∈ Fp
ETEKj () Symmetric encryption using TEKj
rj(x) A revocation polynomial
sid0 A random initial session identifier of GM
sidj GM’s identifier in session j
Wj A set of identifiers of all revoked users for sessions in and before session j
rj1, . . . , r
j
wj Identifiers of revoked users for sessions in and before session j
s(i, y) Personal key of user Ui
s(i, sidj) Personal key of user Ui with session identifier sidj in session j
P jli A proof of sponsorization generated by Ul ∈ Gj to sponsor a user Ui ∈ Gj for session j
al. proposed formal definitions, lower bounds on the resources
and some constructions for a self-healing key distribution
scheme. The main goal of the scheme is the self-healing
property: if during a certain session some broadcasted packet
gets lost, then users are still capable of recovering the group
key for that session simply by using the packets they have
received during a previous session and the packets they
will receive at the beginning of a subsequent one, without
requesting additional transmission from the group manager.
From the time of Staddon et al.’s publication, self-healing key
distribution schemes have become a hot research topic.
Liu, Ning and Sun in [17] generalized the self-healing key
distribution definition in [16] and gave some schemes. Liu
et al.’s scheme reduced communication overhead and storage
overhead by introducing a novel personal key distribution
technique. In addition, they developed two techniques that
allow trade-off between the broadcast message size and the
recoverability of lost session keys. The two methods further
reduce the broadcast message size in situations where there
are frequent but short-term disruptions of communication
and where there are long-term but infrequent disruptions of
communication, respectively.
Blundo et al. in [18] showed an attack that can be applied
to the first construction in [16], presented a new mechanism
for implementing the self-healing approach, extended the self-
healing approach to key distribution, and proposed another
key-recovery scheme which enabled each user to recover all
lost session keys (for sessions in which he belongs to the
group) by using only the current broadcast message. More et
al. in [19] used a sliding window to address the three problems
in [16]. The three problems were inconsistent robustness,
high overhead and expensive maintenance costs. Dutta et
al. in [22] developed a new self-healing key distribution
scheme. The main emphasis of the scheme is that it has
significant improvement in terms of both storage overhead
and communication overhead. All of these papers mainly
focused on unconditionally secure schemes, which are based
on information theory [23].
By introducing an improved secret sharing scheme, Tian
et al. in [25] proposed a self-healing key scheme with novel
properties. Firstly, the scheme reduced storage overhead of
personal key to a constant. Secondly, the scheme conceals
the requirement of secure channel in setup phase. In addition,
the long-lived scheme was much more efficient than those
in [16] and [18]. However, the efficiency improvements are
obtained by relaxing the security slightly. The scheme is a
computationally secure scheme.
The authors of this paper propose a threshold self-healing
key distribution scheme with sponsorization. The scheme
proposed belongs to the category of polynomial secret sharing
based self-healing key distribution schemes and is therefore
based on the idea of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. The
difference between the proposed scheme and Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme is discussed at the end of this section.
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B. Vector space secret sharing based self-healing key distri-
bution schemes
Sáez in [20] first considered applying vector space secret
sharing instead of Shamir’s secret sharing schemes to realize
a self-healing key distribution scheme. The scheme made use
of general monotone decreasing structures for the family of
subsets of users that can be revoked instead of a threshold
one. The length of broadcast was variable according to the
condition of networks. Sáez in [21] considered the possibility
that a coalition of users sponsor a user outside the group
for one session. The formal definition, some bounds on the
required amount of information, and general construction
of a family of self-healing key distribution schemes with
sponsorization by means of a linear secret sharing scheme
was proposed. The particular case of this general construction
when Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is used is analyzed at
the end of this section. Subsubsection text here.
C. Hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes
Bohio and Miri in [26] considered incorporating the self-
healing feature to Subset Difference (SD) method, which was
proposed by Naor et al. in [31]. Some optimization techniques
that can be used to reduce the overhead caused by the self-
healing capability are proposed in [26]. In addition, the idea
of mutual self-healing was discussed. One motivation behind
mutual self-healing is that, if a node has missed a key updating
message, it does not have to wait until the next update
broadcast to recover the previous session key. Instead, it can
look for assistance from its neighboring nodes to recover that
key instantly.
Jiang et al. in [27] proposed an efficient self-healing group
key scheme with time-limited node revocation based on Dual
Directional Hash Chains (DDHC). The performance of the
proposed scheme under poor broadcast channel conditions is
evaluated by both analysis and numerical results. The result
shows that the scheme can tolerate high channel loss rate, and
hence make good balance performance and security, which is
suitable for wireless network applications.
D. Comparison for the three categories schemes
Shamir’s secret sharing is the most common technique used
to realize self-healing key distribution. It performs easily.
However, the maximum number of revoked users is con-
strained by the degree of the polynomial.
Vector space secret sharing based self-healing key dis-
tribution schemes consider a monotone decreasing family
of rejected user subset instead of a monotone decreasing
threshold structure. This general case makes the self-healing
scheme more flexible and close to practical applications.
Both forward and backward secrecy can be kept by dual
directional hash chains. However, the feature of resisting
collusion of revoked nodes and new joined nodes can not be
assured, due to the properties of one-way hash functions.
E. Difference between the proposed scheme and Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme
Both the scheme proposed by the authors of this paper and
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme are suited to applications in
which a subgroup of users up to a threshold value may be
compromised and a coalition of at least threshold-value users
of the rest must cooperate in order to recover the secret key.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme has these properties:
1) to recover the original key given any subset of threshold-
value secret pieces;
2) support Join and/or Leave operation;
3) any coalition of users up to the threshold value cannot
recover the secret key.
Besides the properties of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme,
our scheme has these additional properties:
1) Any t + 1 users of the group can sponsor a new user
to join the group for subsequent sessions without any
interaction with the group manager.
2) The distance between two broadcasts which are used
to recover the lost one can be set according to the
underlying wireless networks. By this way, a shorter
length of the broadcast messages is achieved.
3) The storage overhead of personal keys at each group
user is a polynomial over Fp, which will not increase
with the number of sessions.
4) Both forward security and backward security are kept
in our scheme.
5) If some broadcasts get lost during a certain session,
users can still recover the group key for that session
simply by using the broadcasts they have received before
that session and the broadcasts they will receive at the
beginning of a subsequent one.
III. PROPOSED SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION WITH
SPONSORIZATION
This section details the authors proposed system parameters,
security model and concrete construction.
A. System parameters
In the model proposed here, communication group is a
dynamic subset of users of U . A broadcast unreliable channel
is available, and time is defined by a global clock. GM
sets up and manages, by means of joining and revoking
operations, a communication. We denote the set of users
revoked by the group manager in session j by Rj , and the
set of users who join the group in session by j by Jj . Hence,
Gj = (Gj−1 ∪ Jj)/Rj for j ≥ 2. By definition, there is
G1 = U . Each user Ui ∈ Gj holds a personal key Si ∈ Fp,
received from GM before or when joining Gj . The personal
key Si can be seen as a sequence of elements from a finite set.
In particular, we assume that session keys Kj ∈ Fp are chosen
independently and according to the uniform distribution. For
Ui ∈ Gj and j = 1, . . . , m, the session key Kj can be
determined by Si and Bj . Kj can also be computed by a
user Ui ∈ Gj sponsored by more than t users in Gj by means
of Bj and sponsorization message.
B. Security model
The model proposed here is similar to the one given in
[20]. To clarify our scheme, we provide the following formal
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definition of the threshold self-healing key distribution scheme
with sponsorization capability.
Definition 4.1: Let U be the universe of users of a network,
T is a threshold and T ≤ m. A threshold self-healing key
distribution scheme with sponsroization is a protocol satisfying
the following conditions:
1) The scheme is a session key distribution scheme, mean-
ing that:
(a) For each user Ui ∈ Gj , the key Kj is determined
by Si and Bj . Formally, it holds that:
H(Kj |Bj , Si) = 0. (1)
(b) Keys K1, . . . , Km cannot be determined from the
broadcast or personal keys alone. That is:
H(K1, . . . , Km|B1, . . . , Bm)
= H(K1, . . . , Km|SG1∪...∪Gm)
= H(K1, . . . , Km) = 0. (2)
SG1∪...∪Gm is the set of personal keys of users who
belongs to communication group G1, . . . , Gm.
2) The scheme has t-revocation capability. That is, for each
session j, R = Rj∪. . .∪R2 and |Rj∪. . .∪R2| ≤ t. Then
GM can generate a broadcast message Bj such that all
revoked users in R, even knowing all the information
broadcast in sessions 1, . . . , j, cannot recover Kj . In
other words:
H(Kj |B1, . . . , Bj, SR) = H(Kj). (3)
3) The scheme is self-healing. This means that the follow-
ing properties are satisfied:
(a) Every Ui ∈ Gr , who has not been revoked after
session j1 and before session j2 can recover all keys
Kl for l = j1, . . . , j2, from broadcasts Bj1 and Bj2 ,
where 1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m with j2 − j1 ≤ T . Formally, it
holds that:
H(Kj1 , . . . , Kj2 |Si, Bj1 , Bj2) = 0. (4)
(b) Let Rj1 ⊆ Rj1−1 ∪ . . . ∪ R2 be a coalition of users
joined before session j1, where |Rj1 | ≤ t. Then, users
in Rj1 together cannot get any information about Kj1 ,
even with the knowledge of group keys before session
j1.
H(Kj1 |B1, . . . , Bj1−1, SRj1 , K1, . . . , Kj1−1)
= H(Kj1). (5)
Note that broadcast messages B1, . . . , Bj1−1 are suffi-
cient in the above equation (5). This is because users
Rj1 in have been revoked before session j1. Although
they can get the broadcast messages Bj1 , . . . , Bm in and
after session j1, the users in Rj1 however will not be
able to perform any Key Computation for Kj1 , . . . , Km.
Furthermore, if the broadcast messages are encapsulated
using Traffic Encryption Key [28], then users in Rj1
cannot get Bj1 , . . . , Bm. Therefore, it is sufficient using
B1, . . . , Bj1−1 in Equation (5). A similar reason for
Equation (6) below is held for being sufficient using
Bj2+1, . . . , Bm.
(c) Let Jj2 ⊆ Rj2+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Jm be a coalition of users
join after session j2, where |Jj2 | ≤ t. Then, users in
Jj2 together cannot get any information about Kj2 , even
with the knowledge of group keys after session j2.
H(Kj2 |B1, . . . , Bm, SJj2 , Ks+1, . . . , Km) = H(Kj2).
(6)
4) The scheme has sponsorization capability. This means
that the following properties are satisfied:
(a) Every user Ul ∈ Gj can generate a proof of
sponsorization P jli to sponsor a user Ui ∈ Gj for session
j using his personal key. In other words:
H(P jli|Sl) = 0. (7)
(b) A user Ui /∈ Gj who receives more than spon-
sorizations from a subset of users in session j, together
with the broadcast information, can compute the key
Kj(r ≤ j ≤ s). That is:
H(Kj|P jAi, Br, Bs) = 0. (8)
Condition 1) states that every user Ui ∈ Gj , from the
broadcast and his own personal key, recovers the current
session; while, personal keys and broadcasts alone, do not
give any information about any session key. Condition 2)
states that a collusion of t or less revoked users does not
give information about the current session key. The condition
means GM is able to revoke users at most from the group.
Condition 3)(a) characterizes the self-healing property: any
two broadcasts are enough to recover all lost session keys
for the "sandwich" sessions. Condition 3)(b) and 3)(c) de-
scribe the forward security and backward security separately.
Conditions 4)(a) expresses the mechanism of sponsorization:
the information used to sponsor is computed from the user
Ui’s personal key Si. Conditions 4)(b) indicates the fact that
the information obtained from enough sponsorization with
corresponding broadcasts allows to compute the session key
for each user.
C. Construction
We take a random one way permutation f over Fp such
that f i(u) = f j(u) for all positive integers i, j, and u ∈ Fp.
f i(u) means the permutation f is applied i times on u ∈ Fp.
The self-healing key distribution scheme with sponsorization
abilities is composed of six procedures.
C.1. Setup
Suppose G1 = U1, . . . , Un, the corresponding identities
of users in G1 are 1, . . . , n, respectively. Let t be a
positive integer. The GM chooses at random a polynomial
s(x, y) = a0,0 + a1,0x + a0,1y + . . . + at,txtyt from Fp[x, y]
and a random initial session identifier sid0 ∈ Fp. GM sends
sid0 and personal key s(i, y) to user Ui (i = 1, . . . , n) via
secure communication channel. GM also selects randomly T
session keys K1, . . . , KT ∈ Fp.
C.2. Broadcast
In the j-th (j ≥ 1) session key distribution, given a
set of all revoked users and its corresponding identifier set
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Wj = r
j
1, . . . , r
j
wj for sessions in and before session j (where
rj1, . . . , r
j
wj are identifiers of revoked users and |Wj | = ωj ≤
t; for each rji , it is shared by the user Urji ∈ Gj and the
GM, and made public by the GM), GM executes the following
operations:
1) GM computes its j-th session identifier sidj =
f(sidj−1).
2) GM constructs Pj(x) = rj(x)Kj + s(x, sidj), where
rj(x) = (x− rj1) . . . (x− rjwj ) is called revocation poly-
nomial and s(x, sidj) is called a masking polynomial.
3) GM broadcasts message Bj = B1j ∪ B2j . The first part




{Max(Pj−T (x), P1(x)), . . . , Pj(x)} j=3, . . . , m
The second part of the broadcast is B2j = Wj .
C.3. Key computation
Any non-revoked user Ui receives the broadcast message
Bj . He first computes the session identifier sidj = f(sidj−1)
and replaces the previous session identifier sidj−1 by the
current value sidj for j ≥ 1. In case j = 1, sid1 is stored. Ui
constructs rj(x) by B2j . Correspondingly, he computes Finally,
Ui computes the session key:
Kj =
Pj(i) − s(i, sidj)
rj(i)
(9)
Note that from the set B2j in the broadcast message Bj , all
users Ui can construct the polynomial rj(x) and consequently,
can compute the value rj(i). In particular, for revoked users
Ui ∈ ∪ji=1Wi, there exists rj(i) = 0. Hence the revoked users
can not recover the current session key from the broadcast
message.
Remark: The most expensive computation overhead for
Ui is the one of computing s(i, sidj). One possible way
is to compute a single point {i, s(i, sidj)} at the t-degree
polynomial s(x, sidj) per each session. In order to do this,
Ui gets s(x, sidj) from s(x, y) with input sidj . However,
the coefficients in s(x, sidj) are not known to Ui. Therefore,
it is impossible for her/him to calculate i, s(i, sidj) at the
t-degree polynomial s(x, sidj). Another way is to evaluate
a single point sidj , s(i, sidj) at the t-degree polynomial
s(i, y). This is feasible. In fact, Ui has personal key s(i, y)
which indicates the coefficients in s(i, y) are known to Ui.
What she/he needs to do is to take y = sidj as input for
s(i, y) over Fp. It takes O((logt)(log2p)) bit operations to
get s(i, sidj).
C.4. Self-healing
Let Ui be a user that receives session key distribution mes-
sage Bj1 in session j1 and Bj2 in session j2, respectively, but
not the message Bj for session j, where 1 ≤ j1 < j < j2 ≤ m
and j2 − j1 ≤ T . User Ui can still recover all the lost session
keys Kj for j1 < j < j2 as follows:
1) In j1-th session, Ui first computes sidj1 = f j1(sid0),
rj1(i)and Pj1(i) from the broadcast messageBj1 . Then
Ui recovers the j1-th session key
Kj1 =
Pj1(i) − s(i, sidj1)
rj1 (i)
(10)
2) In j2-th session, Ui first computes sidj2 = f j2(sid0),
rj2 (i) and Pj2(i) from the broadcast message Bj2 . Then
Ui recovers the j2-th session key
Kj2 =
Pj2(i) − s(i, sidj2)
rj2 (i)
(11)
3) For j = j1 + 1, . . . , j2 − 1, Ui first computes sidj =
f(sidj−1). He recovers Pj(i) and rj(i) from the broad-
cast messages in turn. Finally Ui recovers the j-th
session key
Kj =
Pj(i) − s(i, sidj)
rj(i)
(12)
Remark: How to recover rj(i) from the broadcast mes-
sages? In fact, notice that the procedure in the Broadcast
enables Ui to get broadcast message Bj = B1j ∪ B2j . The




{Max(Pj−T (x), P1(x)), . . . , Pj(x)} j=3, . . . , m
The second part of the broadcast is B2j = Wj . Therefore,
Ui can get {rj1, . . . , rjwj} which is in fact B2j . By the definition
of rj(x), Ui can recover rj(i) as follows:
rj(i) = (i − rj1)(i − rj2) . . . (i − rjwj ) (13)
C.5. Add and revoke group users
When GM wants to add a user Ui′ (i
′ = 1, . . . , n) starting
from session j, he sends personal key s(i
′
, y) and sidj via
secure communication channel between them. If a user Ui
is revoked in session j, his identity i must be included in the
second part of the broadcast message in the following sessions.
In particular, once a user Ui is revoked, he must be revoked
in all the future sessions.
Remark: The scheme requires that once a certain user
Ui is revoked in session j, then he must be revoked in all
the future sessions. Otherwise, the revoked user in session j
rejoins the group in a later session can recover the key for
session j due to the self-healing capability of the scheme.
C.6. Sponsorization
If a user Ul ∈ Gj wants to sponsor a user Ui ∈ Gj for
session j, then he computes (l, s(l, sidj)) from his personal
key s(l, y) and sends it privately to Ui. Ui can compute
s(x, sidj) after receiving t+1 sponsored messages from user
subset A ⊆ Gj (where t+1 ≤ |A| ≤ |Gj | ≤ n). Therefore, he
can compute s(i, sidj). According to broadcast message Bj ,
he computes Pj(i) and rj(i). Consequently, the user Ui can
compute the session key as:
Kj =
Pj(i) − s(i, sidj)
rj(i)
(14)
The above self-healing key distribution process has been
illustrated in Fig.2. Note that the exact order of these pro-
cedures is slightly different from the ones appeared in Fig.2.
This is because Add/Revoke Operation may not take place and
Broadcast message loss may not occur.
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Fig. 2. The process of the self-healing key distribution scheme with
sponsorization, where the panes are operations which must be executed in each
round , the dashed frames represent the operations which may not executed
in one round of the scheme.
IV. ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE
This section begins with our analysis of the security of
the proposed scheme according to the Definition 4.1. This is
followed by a discussion of implicit authentication of session
keys, and a possible solution to the secure distribution and
verification for broadcast messages. This section concludes
with an analysis of the efficiency of the proposed scheme
in terms of storage overhead and communication overhead.
To clarify the advantages of our scheme, a performance
comparison of our scheme with some existing schemes is
presented.
A. Analysis of security
Findings from an analysis of security of the scheme in
relation to Definition 4.1 suggest that the scheme facilitates
a threshold self-healing key distribution with sponsorization
capability.
1) Our scheme satisfies Condition 1) in Definition 4.1;
therefore, it is a session key distribution scheme.
(a) Session key recovery by a user is described in Key
computation phase of the construction.
(b) On the one hand, since the session keys are chosen
according to the uniform distribution and independence
of the personal keys, it is straightforward to see that the
personal keys alone do not give any information about
any session key. On the other hand, it is not difficult to
see that every Pj(x), for j = 1, . . . , m, perfectly hides
key Kj because Pj(x) = rj(x)Kj + s(x, sidj). The set
of session keys can not be determined only by broadcast
messages.
2) Our scheme satisfies Condition 2) in Definition 4.1,
therefore, it has t-revocation capability.
Suppose that a collection R of t revoked group members
in session j collude. In order to recover the session
key Kj from the broadcast, revoked users in R must
compute rj(i). However, for all revoked users Ui, exists
rj(i) = 0. Therefore, Kj is completely safe.
3) Our scheme satisfies Condition 3) in Definition 4.1,
therefore, it is self-healing. The maximum number of
session keys that users can recover one time is T .
(a) For any Ui who is a user in session j1 and j2(1 ≤
j1 < j2 ≤ m and j2 − j1 ≤ T ), by the method
of key computation step in self-healing phase, Ui can
subsequently recover the whole sequence of session keys
Kj1 , . . . , Kj2 . In fact, in our construction, a qualified
user can recover the all the session keys before session
j2. This is a stronger self-healing scheme.
(b) For any user Ui in set Rj1 ⊆ Rj1−1∪. . .∪R2, where
|Rj1 | ≤ t, exists rj(i) = 0 (1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m). Session
keys are chosen at random and according to uniform,
even with the knowledge of group keys before session
j1, Ui can not get any information about the current
session key Kj . Therefore, the backward security is
kept.
(c) For any user Ui in set Jj2 ⊆ Rj2+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Jm,
where |Jj2 | ≤ t , the users in Jj2 together cannot obtain
sidj(j1 ≤ j ≤ j2), even with the knowledge of group
keys after session j2. Therefore, Ui can not compute the
session key Kj , thus the forward security is kept.
4) Our scheme satisfies Condition 4) in Definition 4.1,
therefore, it has sponsorization capability.
(a) Every user Ul ∈ Gj can generate a proof of
sponsorization P jli to sponsor a user Ui ∈ Gj for session
j using his personal key.
(b) Seen from Sponsorization phase, the user Ui ∈ Gj
that receives more than t + 1 sponsorizations from a
subset of users in Gj can recover the session key Kj .
Theorem 1. Given user Ui ∈ Gj who receives more than t+
1 sponsorizations from a subset of users in Gj , the session key
Kj generated by Ui satisfies the existence and the uniqueness.
Proof: Note that
s(x, y) = a0,0 + a1,0x + a0,1y + . . . + at,txtyt (15)
Then we have
s(x, sidj) = a0,0 + a0,1sidj + a1,0x + . . . + (sidj)tat,txt
(16)
which is a t-degree polynomial with variable x. We rewrite it
to get
s(x, sidj) = b0 + b1x + . . . + btxt (17)
Suppose there are (t+1) users Ul1 , Ul2 , . . . , Ult+1 in Gj to
sponsor user Ui ∈ Gj , then Uli uses her/his personal key
s(li′ , y) to compute
(li′ , s(li′ , y)),
where 1 ≤ i′ ≤ t + 1. These (t + 1) users, respectively, send
privately
(li′ , s(li′ , y))(1 ≤ i′ ≤ t + 1)
to user Ui ∈ Gj . After receiving these value-pairs, Ui does
the substitution using (li′ , s(li′ , y)) for the Equation (17) and
gets the following system of linear equations:
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
b0 + l1b1 + . . . + (l1)tbn = s(l1, sidj)
b0 + l2b1 + . . . + (l2)tbn = s(l2, sidj)
...
b0 + lt+1b1 + . . . + (lt+1)tbn = s(lt+1, sidj)
(18)





1 l1 (l1)2 . . . (l1)t












(lj1 − lj2). (19)
This is a Vandermonde determinant [33]. If and only if
lj1 = lj2(j1 = 1, 2, . . . , t + 1; j2 = 1, 2, . . . , t + 1; j1 = j2),
there is
D = 0.
In fact, Ul1 , Ul2 , . . . , Ult+1 are different users in Gj and thus
their IDs are different, i.e.
lj1 = lj2(j1 = 1, 2, . . . , t + 1; j2 = 1, 2, . . . , t + 1; j1 = j2).
Hence, the system of linear equations in (18) has a solution
{b0, b1, . . . , bt} and also this solution is unique. Therefore,
s(x, sidj) = b0 + b1x + . . . + btxt
is uniquely determined by {b0, b1, . . . , bt}. Therefore, user Ui
can compute a unique s(i, sidj) with x = i for Equation (16).
By the broadcast message Bj , he/she computes Pj(x) and
rj(i). Finally, Ui gets a unique j-th session key
Kj =
Pj(i) − s(i, sidj)
rj(i)
.
Notice that the above calculations are executed over Fp.
Therefore, the j-th session key Kj exists and is unique. Thus
the Theorem 1 is concluded.
B. Implicit authentication of session keys
The session key generated in the self-healing key distribu-
tion scheme is implicitly authenticated. This can be demon-
strated from four aspects:
1) Any external attacker cannot generate the session key.
An external attacker is an adversary who is neither a
current user of the group nor a revoked user from the
group. Therefore, this attacker does not have the initial
session identifier sid0 ∈ Fp or personal key s(i, y)
to user Ui(i = 0, . . . , n). Although this attacker can
intercept some broadcast messages, he is not yet able to
generate the session key
Kj =
Pj(i) − s(i, sidj)
rj(i)
,
which needs two secret elements sid0 ∈ Fp and s(i, y).
2) Any internal user who has been revoked cannot generate
a new session key.
For all revoked users Ul, rj(i) = 0. Therefore, any
revoked user cannot generate a new session key.
3) Any internal valid users up to t +1 cannot generate the
session key.
This property is obviously held since our scheme is a
(t + 1)-threshold key distribution scheme.
4) Any internal valid user Ui can generate the session key
of any session the user belongs to.
An internal valid user Ui is a user who has not been
revoked in the underlying communication group. Sup-
pose Ui belongs to the session group Gj . Hence, Ui
can receive the broadcast message Bj from GM. Ui
first computes the session identifier sidj = f(sidj−1)
and then gets s(i, sidj) by her/his personal key s(i, y).
Notice that Bj = B1j ∪B2j . Hence, Ui can compute Pj(i)
from B1j and constructs rj(i). Finally, can compute the
session key
Kj =
Pj(i) − s(i, sidj)
rj(i)
.
C. Possible solution to secure distribution and verification of
broadcast messages
In Section III, we have focused on the exact construction of
the threshold self-healing key distribution with sponsorization
capability by Definition 4.1. Therefore, we do not discuss the
secure distribution and verification for broadcast messages.
However, the secure distribution and verification for broadcast
messages are useful to the correctness and availability of a
group key distribution scheme. We thus present a possible
solution to this issue.
An efficient solution to the secure distribution and verifi-
cation for broadcast messages is to use a Traffic Encryption
Key (TEK) to encrypt broadcast messages [28] by symmetric
encryption. In fact the scheme in [27] used a TEK to distribute
broadcast messages and achieved implicit authentication for
broadcast messages.
Here we reconstruct Broadcast and Key Computation in
our scheme to demonstrate how the secure distribution and
verification for broadcast message Bj = B1j ∪ B2j work.
C.2.new1. Broadcast
In the j-th (j ≥ 1) session key distribution, given a
set of identifiers of all revoked users Wj = {rj1, . . . , rjwj}
for sessions in and before session j (where rj1, . . . , r
j
wj are
identifiers of revoked users and |Wj | = wj ≤ t), GM executes
the following operations:
1) GM computes its j-th session identifier sidj =
f(sidj−1).
2) GM constructs Pj(x) = rj(x)Kj + s(x, sidj), where
rj(x) = (x − rj1) . . . (x − rjwj ) is called a revocation
polynomial and s(x, sidj) is called a masking polyno-
mial.




{Max(Pj−T (x), P1(x)), . . . , Pj(x)} j=3, . . . , m
and B2j = Wj .
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4) GM computes a Traffic Encryption Key
TEKj = g(B1j−1, Kj−1, B
2
j−1).
Here we prefer to use g(B1j−1, Kj−1, B
2
j−1) but not
g(Bj , Kj−1). This is because Bj is not a suitable format
for encryption. We also denote a ciphertext on broadcast
message Bj by ETEKj (B1j , sidj) .
5) GM finally broadcasts
{ETEKj(1)(B1j (i), sidj), ETEKj(2)(B1j (2), sidj), . . . ,
ETEKj(|Gj |)(B
1





After receiving broadcast message ETEKj (B1j , sidj) and
B2j , any non-revoked user Ui obtains the session key Kj by
carrying out the operations below:
1) Ui uses the session key Kj−1 and broadcast messages
B1j−1(i) and B
2
j−1 to derive the new Traffic Encryption
Key TEKj(i) = g(B1j−1(i), Kj−1, B
2
j−1). Note that Ui
got Kj−1, B1j−1(i), and B
2
j−1 in the (j − 1)-th session.
2) Ui uses TEKj(i) to decrypt ETEKj(i)(B
1
j (i), sidj) to
get B1j (i) and sidj .
3) If sidj = f(sidj−1), then Ui accepts Bj(i) = B1j (i) ∪
B2j (i) as a valid broadcast message; Otherwise, Ui
discards the broadcast message.
4) Ui constructs the revocation polynomial rj(x) by B2j .
He then computes rj(i), s(i, sidj) and Pj(i).




6) Ui computes the Traffic Encryption Key
TEKj(i) = g(B1j , Kj , B
2
j )
for (j + 1)-th session by B1j , B
2
j and Kj .
The above new Broadcast and Key Computation procedures
provide secure distribution and verification for broadcast mes-
sages. This is because the broadcast message Bj has been
encrypted using a symmetric encryption function. This result
in authorized access to broadcast messages is only granted to
users who have the corresponding Traffic Encryption Keys. On
the other hand, the verification of sidj = f(sidj−1) implies
a verification on broadcast message Bj = B1j ∪ B2j . This is
because if sidj = f(sidj−1), then the received ciphertext is
not a correct one. This is an implicit authentication for this
broadcast message.
The above new procedures C.2.new1 Broadcast and
C.3.new1 Key Computation can ensure the secure distribution
and verification for broadcast messages but introduces
communication and computation overheads. In the following,
we will present another method which can not only ensure the
secure distribution and verification for broadcast messages but
also keeps communication overhead at a constant. In addition,
the new method also has less computation overhead than
the one which is described above. The following procedures
show how this new method works:
C.2.new2. Broadcast
In the j-th (j ≥ 1) session key distribution, given a
set of identifiers of all revoked users Wj = {rj1, . . . , rjwj}
for sessions in and before session j (where rj1, . . . , r
j
wj are
identifiers of revoked users and |Wj | = wj ≤ t), GM executes
the following operations:
1) GM computes its j-th session identifier sidj =
f(sidj−1).
2) GM constructs Pj(x) = rj(x)Kj + s(x, sidj), where
rj(x) = (x − rj1) . . . (x − rjwj ) is called a revocation
polynomial and s(x, sidj) is called a masking polyno-
mial.




{Max(Pj−T (x), P1(x)), . . . , Pj(x)} j=3, . . . , m
and B2j = Wj .
4) GM computes a Traffic Encryption Key
TEKj = g(sidj−1)
and a ciphertext ETEKj (Bj , sidj) on broadcast message
Bj .
5) GM finally broadcasts ETEKj (Bj , sidj) to group users.
Remark: In the above procedure, those revoked users can
also compute Traffic Encryption Key TEKj = g(sidj−1)
since they have sidj−1. Therefore, they can decrypt the
encrypted broadcast message ETEKj (Bj , sidj). However,
those revoked users cannot work out the new session key Kj .
This is because rj(x) = 0 for those revoked users.
C.3.new2 Key Computation
After receiving broadcast message ETEKj (Bj , sidj), any
non-revoked user Ui obtains the session key Kj by carrying
out the operations below:
1) Ui uses sidj−1 to derive the new Traffic Encryption Key
TEKj(i) = g(sidj−1). Note that Ui got sidj−1 in the
(j − 1)-th session.
2) Ui uses TEKj(i) to decrypt ETEKj(i)(Bj , sidj) to get
Bj and sidj .
3) If sidj = f(sidj−1), then Ui accepts Bj = B1j ∪B2j as
a valid broadcast message; Otherwise, Ui discards the
broadcast message.
4) Ui constructs the revocation polynomial rj(x) by B2j .
He then computes rj(i), s(i, sidj) and Pj(i).




6) Ui computes the Traffic Encryption Key
TEKj+1(i) = g(sidj)
for (j + 1)-th session by sidj .
Remark: In the above procedure Key Computation, if a
user Ui ∈ Gj but Ui ∈ Gj−1, then Ui himself/herself cannot
get Kj−1 and therefore cannot recover the Traffic Encryption
Key TEKj(i). Our solution to this situation is: Ui asks her/his
nearest neighbour Ul ∈ Gj to privately transfer Key TEKj(l)
to him/her. Ui can use Key TEKj(l) to decrypt the encrypted
broadcast message ETEKj(l)(Bj , sidj) and get Bj . Finally,
he/she can recover the session key Kj .
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D. Analysis of efficiency
In this section we make a performance comparison between
some existing self-healing key distribution schemes and our
scheme.
In terms of storage overhead, our scheme requires that each
user stores a personal key of size (t + 1)logp in each session.
It comes from the procedure of Setup and after receiving
the session key distribution broadcast. In the procedure of
Setup, each user stores the initial session identifier sid0 and
a t-degree polynomial as his personal key. After receiving
the session key distribution broadcast, each user stores the
j-th session identifier sidj . All of these elements are taken
from . Moreover, the maximum number of sessions m is no
longer needed to be determined in the procedure of Setup.
Consequently, our scheme eliminates the limitation of m
sessions in previous works [16]-[18] and [21]. The storage
overhead of the schemes in [16]-[18] and [21] increases with
j and the maximum number of sessions should be determined
in the procedure of Setup.
The broadcast message Bj for the j-th session consists of
a set of revoked users Wj and T t-degree polynomials. Since
the user identities can be selected over a small finite field
[24], one can ignore the communication overhead brought by
the broadcast message of the set Wj . Thus the size of the
broadcast message in the j-th session is T tlogp.
To clarify the performance of the proposed scheme, a
comparison of our scheme and some existing schemes is
presented. TABLE II summaries the comparison of storage and
communication overheads between these five self-healing key
distribution schemes. The reason that we choose the schemes
in [16] - [18] and [21] for performance comparison is: the
selected schemes in [16] - [18] are all based on Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme; and the scheme in [21] is the first
scheme which has sponsorization capability. Consider that
our scheme is based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and
also has strong sponsorization capability, we therefore have
selected those schemes for performance comparison.
We use C to denote Construction and S to denote Scheme,
for example, C3 in [16] denote the Construction 3 in [16]. In
previous schemes, storage overhead increases with the order
of session . Without loss of generality, we set j = m/2 and
we set T = m/3. In addition, we assume that p is a 64-bit
integer. Suppose the maximum number of session m = 100
and the number of revoked users varies from 0 to 100.
Fig.3 and Fig.4 illustrate the increasing tendency of broad-
casts for the five self-healing key distribution schemes. It is
easy to see our scheme has less communication overhead than
the previous schemes have for the same value of m and t.
In addition, when t climbs to 100, the size of broadcast in
our scheme is approximately of 20kB while that of other
schemes exceeds 80kB. One of the predominant characteristics
of wireless networks is they have very limited resources. The
proposed scheme makes use of smaller packets and is therefore
quite suitable for real applications where available resources
are very limited. Fig.5 displays the tradeoff between m and
t given a maximum of 64kB packet size. When t increases
to 100, the maximum number of sessions in our scheme is
still around 250 while that of others is far less than 250.
Fig. 3. describes the increase tendency of the size of broadcast when t
varies from 0 to 100 and m=100. This figure demonstrates the performance
of Construction 3 of [16] and Scheme of [21].
Fig. 4. describes the increase tendency of the size of broadcast when t
varies from 0 to 100 and m=100. This figure demonstrates the performance
of Scheme 3 of [17], Scheme 2 of [18] and Our Scheme.
Obviously, our scheme allows more sessions and can deal with
more revoking users under the same conditions.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper the authors proposed a new self-healing key
distribution scheme. The proposed scheme has sponsorization
capability and enables a large and dynamic group of users
to establish a session key for secure communications over an
unreliable wireless network. In order to shorten the length
of broadcast messages, the distance between two broadcasts
used to recover the lost one is adjustable in our scheme. The
scheme also enables a user to recover, from a single broadcast
message, T keys associated with the sessions in which she/he
belongs to the group. The storage overhead of personal keys is
a polynomial over Fp, which will not increase with the number
of sessions. The proposed scheme has been comprehensively
analyzed in an appropriate security model to prove that it is
secure and self-healing and also achieves both forward security
and backward security.
The fact that new personal keys are needed with every
session presents an interesting problem in previous schemes
[16]-[21]. The long-lived personal key schemes are provided
in [16] and [18]. However, they do not properly fit for prac-
tical applications where the cost of modular exponentiations
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TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Schemes Storage Overhead Communication Overhead
Construction 3 (m − j + 1)2 log p (mt2 + 2mt + m + t) log p
of [16]
Scheme 3 2(m − j + 1) log p [(m + j + 1)t + m + 1] log p
of [17]
Scheme 2 (m − j + 1) log p (2tj + j) log p
of[18]
Scheme (m − j + 1) log p 0.5(m2 − m + 2)t log p
of [21]
Our scheme (t + 1) log p T t log p
Fig. 5. Possible values of m and t for different self-healing key distribution
schemes, which are the areas under the corresponding lines. Assume that p
is a 64-bit integer.
involved may be prohibitive due to the very limited commu-
nication resources. It is claimed that in [22] the personal key
can be reused without any alternation. In fact, the personal
keys can be re-used on condition that less than t + 1 users
are revoked. Therefore, it is interesting to further explore the
reusable personal keys.
The proposed scheme similarizes ideas to those found in
[21]. That is, a coalition composed of more than t + 1 users
in our scheme can sponsor a new user to join the group for
one session without any interaction with the group manager.
Different from the sponsorization capability in [21], the one in
our scheme can enable a new user to recover all session keys
in subsequent sessions for the group communications once
she or he is sponsored and joins the group. This is a stronger
sponsorization capability. Furthermore, our scheme is much
efficient than that of [21] with respect to storage overhead and
communication overhead respectively. In addition, our scheme
has reserved forward security and backward security, which
are imperative properties for group key distributions.
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